The moral dimension of teaching has long been recognized in general education. The education of children often involves conscious, explicit attention to inculcating particular values and character traits, but there is also a sense in which teachers unconsciously act as moral agents. Dewey (1909) was one of the first to draw attention to this aspect of morality in education; he distinguished between what is often referred to as “the teaching of morality”—explicit moral instruction—and “the morality of teaching”—the ways in which what teachers do in classrooms has inherent moral significance in itself. It is very much this latter meaning of morality with which I am concerned in this book. In recent years, both theoretical and empirical research has explored the morality of teaching. Writers such as Tom (1984) and Noddings (1984, 1992) have developed a philosophy of education in which the teacher’s role as moral agent is placed at center
stage. Investigations of empirical data, on the other hand, have explored the ways in which moral issues and moral agency play out in classrooms and schools (Buzzelli & Johnston, 2002; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993; Noblit & Dempsey, 1996). I have much more to say about this literature, especially the theoretical framework proposed by Jackson et al. (1993), in chapter 2, in which I look at the moral substrate of classroom interaction in ELT. There is in fact a large and growing empirical and theoretical literature of the moral in teaching. One may summarize its main findings and ideas as follows, while bearing in mind that all of these authors agree on one thing: Teaching is always and inevitably a profoundly value-laden undertaking, and one whose moral foundations are complex and deserve to be continually reflected on. First, following Dewey’s (1909) seminal work, teaching itself is seen as involving moral action (Tom, 1984). Teachers are moral agents (Bergem, 1990; Johnston, Juhász, Marken, & Ruiz, 1998), and education as a whole, and classroom interaction in particular, is fundamentally and inevitably moral in nature (D.L.Ball & Wilson, 1996; Goodlad, Soder, & Sirotnik, 1990). From the teacher’s point of view, teaching involves constant and complex moral decision making (Tippins, Tobin, & Hook, 1993), and also a sensitivity to possibilities in contexts and individuals that Simpson and Garrison (1995) called moral perception. Second, it is widely recognized that the ways in which values and moral issues are realized in the classroom are complex, subtle, and all pervasive. What Jackson et al. (1993) refer to as the expressive morality of the classroom includes what teachers and students say and how they behave but extends to every aspect of the situation, even the layout and decor of the classroom (see also B.Johnston & Buzzelli, 2002). The moral layeredness of classroom teaching (Hansen, 1993) must thus be acknowledged as a constant feature of educational contexts. Third, there will always exist discrepancies among the various moral values played out in the classroom. These discrepancies may be seen as conflicts (Colnerud, 1997; Joseph & Ephron, 1993), moral dilemmas (D.K.Johnston, 1991), or as contradictions of values (Placier, 1996; Whitehead, 1993), or in terms of moral relativity (Willett, Solsken, & Wilson-Keenan, 1998), but in any case the notion of a single set of moral values for the classroom is highly problematic (Applebaum, 1996). A degree of uncertainty and ambiguity must always accompany discussion and analysis of the moral in classrooms and in education. Last, there is also an ongoing debate in the area of moral eduction—an area that increasingly is seen as including the morality of teaching as well as the teaching of morality—between two opposing positions. One is that of care, as explicated in the work of Noddings and others. The other is the perspective of justice, based indirectly on the work of philosopher John Rawls (1971), in which equity—for example, equal attention to and equal opportunities for every child—is seen as the central principle. Although attempts have been made to resolve this apparent opposition (e.g., M.S.Katz, Noddings, & Strike, 1999), the very opposition itself presents a series of tough moral dilemmas.
stage. Investigations of empirical data, on the other hand, have explored the ways in which moral issues and moral agency play out in classrooms and schools (Buzzelli & Johnston, 2002; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993; Noblit & Dempsey, 1996). I have much more to say about this literature, especially the theoretical framework proposed by Jackson et al. (1993), in chapter 2, in which I look at the moral substrate of classroom interaction in ELT. There is in fact a large and growing empirical and theoretical literature of the moral in teaching. One may summarize its main findings and ideas as follows, while bearing in mind that all of these authors agree on one thing: Teaching is always and inevitably a profoundly value-laden undertaking, and one whose moral foundations are complex and deserve to be continually reflected on. First, following Dewey’s (1909) seminal work, teaching itself is seen as involving moral action (Tom, 1984). Teachers are moral agents (Bergem, 1990; Johnston, Juhász, Marken, & Ruiz, 1998), and education as a whole, and classroom interaction in particular, is fundamentally and inevitably moral in nature (D.L.Ball & Wilson, 1996; Goodlad, Soder, & Sirotnik, 1990). From the teacher’s point of view, teaching involves constant and complex moral decision making (Tippins, Tobin, & Hook, 1993), and also a sensitivity to possibilities in contexts and individuals that Simpson and Garrison (1995) called moral perception. Second, it is widely recognized that the ways in which values and moral issues are realized in the classroom are complex, subtle, and all pervasive. What Jackson et al. (1993) refer to as the expressive morality of the classroom includes what teachers and students say and how they behave but extends to every aspect of the situation, even the layout and decor of the classroom (see also B.Johnston & Buzzelli, 2002). The moral layeredness of classroom teaching (Hansen, 1993) must thus be acknowledged as a constant feature of educational contexts. Third, there will always exist discrepancies among the various moral values played out in the classroom. These discrepancies may be seen as conflicts (Colnerud, 1997; Joseph & Ephron, 1993), moral dilemmas (D.K.Johnston, 1991), or as contradictions of values (Placier, 1996; Whitehead, 1993), or in terms of moral relativity (Willett, Solsken, & Wilson-Keenan, 1998), but in any case the notion of a single set of moral values for the classroom is highly problematic (Applebaum, 1996). A degree of uncertainty and ambiguity must always accompany discussion and analysis of the moral in classrooms and in education. Last, there is also an ongoing debate in the area of moral eduction—an area that increasingly is seen as including the morality of teaching as well as the teaching of morality—between two opposing positions. One is that of care, as explicated in the work of Noddings and others. The other is the perspective of justice, based indirectly on the work of philosopher John Rawls (1971), in which equity—for example, equal attention to and equal opportunities for every child—is seen as the central principle. Although attempts have been made to resolve this apparent opposition (e.g., M.S.Katz, Noddings, & Strike, 1999), the very opposition itself presents a series of tough moral dilemmas.
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